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THE SAC PROPOSAL FOR THE MONETIZATION OF THE FILE SHARING 
OF MUSIC IN CANADA: DOES IT COMPLY WITH CANADA'S 
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO COPYRIGHT?  
 
Barry Sookman* 
 
 
In November 2007, the Songwriters Association of Canada (SAC) released a 
proposal for the monetization of the file sharing of music in Canada. This 
article attempts to determine whether or not Canada, given its international 
and bilateral treaty agreements, could ever adopt the SAC‘s proposal. The 
article approaches this analysis through the ―three-step test‖, which was 
adopted under the Berne Convention in 1971 and enshrined in the 
subsequent TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA; the article also analyzes whether 
or not the Proposal is compatible with Canada‘s obligations under the Rome 
Convention.  The article concludes that, without amendments to the 
international treaties to copyright of which Canada is a part, a proposal like 
SAC‘s could not be successfully enacted. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On 16 November 2007 the Songwriters Association of Canada 
(―SAC‖) issued a press release1 announcing a Proposal for the 
Monetization of the File Sharing of Music (the ―Proposal‖).2  The main 
aspects of the Proposal are the following: 
 The Copyright Act (the ―Act‖) would be amended to 
establish a new right:  ―The Right to Equitable 
Remuneration for Music File Sharing‖.  The term 
―Music File Sharing‖ is defined in the Proposal ―as the 
sharing of a copy of a copyrighted musical work 
without motive of financial gain‖.   
 The amendments to the Act would create exceptions 
or limitations (the ―proposed file sharing exception‖) 
which ―would make it legal to share music between 
two or more parties, whether over Peer-to-Peer 
networks, wireless networks, email, CD, DVD, hard 
                                                          
1 ―Music file sharing proposal‖ (news release), Songwriters Association of Canada (16 
November 2007), online: Songwriters Association of Canada 
<http://www.songwriters.ca/NWS10.php?news_id=24>. 
2 ―A Proposal for the Monetization of the File Sharing of Music From the Songwriters 
and Recording Artists of Canada‖ Songwriters Association of Canada, online: 
Songwriters Association of Canada <http://www.songwriters.ca/studio/proposal.php>. 
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drives, etc.‖  This ―new right would authorize the 
sharing of music with other individuals‖.   
 The proposed file sharing exception would apply ―to 
the majority of the world‘s repertoire of music‖. 
 The proposed file sharing exception would not apply 
to ―parties who receive compensation for file sharing‖.  
Therefore, commercial entities such as iTunes and 
PureTracks would not benefit from the exception.  
Music sites like iTunes and PureTracks would 
continue to be licensed directly by creators and rights 
holders ―and would continue to develop attractive 
‗value added‘ services and security features that keep 
them distinct from the file sharing activities‖.   
 Creators and rights holders would receive equitable 
remuneration in the amount of $5.00 per Internet 
subscription. 
 The Proposal states that ―the amount of income 
generated annually could adequately compensate the 
industry for years of declining sales and lost revenues, 
and would dramatically enhance current legal digital 
music income.  Sales of physical product would 
continue to earn substantial amounts, albeit gradually 
decreasing.‖ 
SAC stated that it sees ―this model being adopted 
internationally‖ and is ―working with Creators‘ groups around the 
world to effect a global system of remuneration for the sharing of 
music files‖.  The Proposal attracted considerable debate and public 
comment.  This article examines part of the debate: whether the 
Proposal could ever be implemented without violating  Canada‘s 
international and bilateral treaties related to copyright.  As explained 
below, the Proposal would violate the three-step test enshrined in the 
Berne Convention,3 the TRIPS Agreement,4 and NAFTA.5  It would 
                                                          
3 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886; 
revised July 24, 1971 and amended 1979, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715. 
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 1197 [TRIPS]. 
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also breach Canada‘s obligations under the Rome Convention.6  
Accordingly, the Proposal, like other proposals to establish 
―alternative compensation systems‖, ―non-commercial use levies‖, and 
―non-voluntary licenses‖ to authorize non-commercial P2P file 
sharing of music7,  could not be implemented in the manner proposed 
without abrogating international agreements related to copyright8. 
 
II 
CANADA‘S APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
 
Proposals for exceptions to copyright are evaluated for 
conformance with Canada‘s international obligations related to 
copyright.9  For example, exceptions to create levies for private 
copying, which create substantially narrower exceptions to exclusive 
rights than the Proposal, are structured to ensure they do not abrogate 
                                                                                                                                  
5 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the 
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, 
Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA].  
6 Rome Convention: International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations 26 October 1961, 496 
U.N.T.S. 44 [Rome Convention]. 
7 See N. W. Netanel, ―Impose a Non-Commercial Use Levy to All Free Peer-to-peer 
File Sharing‖, Harvard J. of Law & Technology (2003) at19 [―Netanel‖]; W. W. 
Fischer, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) at 199-251 [―Fischer‖]; L. Lessig, The 
Future of Ideas, (New York: Random House, 2001) at 254 seq. [―Lessig‖]; Raymond 
Ku,  ―The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology‖ (2002) 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 263 [―Ku‖];  Peter Eckersley, ―Virtual 
Markets for Virtual Goods: The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?‖ (2004) 18 
Harvard J. L. & Tech. 85 [―Eckersley‖]; Jessica Litman, ―Sharing and Stealing‖ (2004) 
24 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. [―Litman‖].  
8 See Bob Rietjens, ―Copyright and the Three-Step Test: Are Broadband Levies Too 
Good to be True?‖ (2006) 20 (3) Int‘l. Rev. L. & Computers 323 [―Rietjens‖]; Alexander 
Peukert, ―A Bipolar Copyright System for the Digital Network Environment‖, (2005)  
28:1 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L. J. [―Peukert‖].  It has also been suggested that the 
federal government would not have the constitutional authority to enact a broad 
based levy on ISPs to provide compensation for unauthorised file sharing.  See Jeremy 
F. de Beer, ―The Role of Levies in Canada‘s Digital Music Market Place‖, (2005) 4:3 
Cdn.  J. L. & Tech. 153.  
9 Wanda Noel et al ―Free v. Fee‖, (2006) 23 C.I.P.R. 1; See also Taking Forward the 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Proposed Changes to Copyright Exceptions, 
U.K. Intellectual Property Office, at paras. 31-32 [Noel]. 
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international obligations related to copyright.10  A  proposal that 
would permit file sharing of music would be subject to this scrutiny 
by the Canadian Government.  Such scrutiny is hardly unusual: the 
German Ministry of Justice, for instance, declined to adopt a new 
exception to copyright with respect to non-commercial file sharing, 
expressly referring to the three-step test under the Berne 
Convention.11 
Whether the Proposal would comply with Canada‘s 
obligations under the Berne Convention, NAFTA, the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Rome Convention is therefore of more than 
academic interest.  Canada has ratified the Berne Convention, Rome 
Convention and TRIPS and is a party to NAFTA.  There are 163 
contracting parties to the Berne Convention, 86 contracting parties to 
the Rome Convention and 151 WTO Members have acceded to the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Canada‘s most significant trading partner, the 
United States, along with Mexico, are parties with Canada to NAFTA.  
Canada cannot easily resile from or change these agreements.  
Further, both the TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA contain dispute 
resolution mechanisms which can result in sanctions for the violation 
of these treaties.12   
Under the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and 
NAFTA, Canada must provide copyright holders with the exclusive 
                                                          
10 Ricketson et al, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, Vol. I, 2d ed. 
(2006) [―Ricketson‖], paras. 10.31-10.34;  Mihály Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and 
the Internet (2002) [―Ficsor‖], §3.16; Opinion of the Council of Copyright Experts, 
No. SzJSzT 17/06 of May 11, 2006 (Hungary) at paras. 8-10 [―Hungarian Opinion‖];  
Remuneration of Private Copying in Australia at 570-71, 582 [―Aust. Report‖]   
11 Peukert, supra note 8 at 51.  
12 The WTO dispute resolution process has been used to address alleged failures of 
countries to honour their treaty obligations related to copyright. See United States – 
Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTO Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R, 15 
June 2000 [the ―WTO Decision‖].  Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products, WT/DS114/R, 17 March, 2000 [―WTO Patent Decision‖].  Also, on 
September 25, 2007, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to review 
China‘s Protection and Enforcement Measures of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/7.  Disputes under the Berne Convention and the Rome Convention can 
be referred to the International Court of Justice by a party to a dispute.  Berne 
Convention, supra note 3 at Article 33; Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 30.  
Further, since members of TRIPs and NAFTA must comply with the applicable 
provisions of the Berne Convention, a breach of that convention by Canada could also 
subject Canada to sanctions under TRIPs and NAFTA.   
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right to make and to authorize reproductions of musical works.13  
Producers of sound recording must be given the exclusive right to 
make and to authorize reproductions of sound recordings pursuant to 
the Rome Convention, NAFTA and the TRIPS Agreement.14  Because 
sound recordings of popular songs intrinsically contain a musical 
work, Canada must comply with each of these international treaties, 
conventions and agreements with respect to both sound recordings 
and musical works.  Further, Canada must provide copyright holders 
with the exclusive right to authorize the communication of musical 
works and performances of musical works to the public.15  Both the 
reproduction right and the right to communicate works to the public 
are relied upon by rights holders to commercially exploit music in 
Canada, including over digital networks like the Internet.16   
                                                          
13 Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 9(1); TRIPS Agreement,  supra  note 4 at 
Part II Article 9.1 (requires compliance with the Berne Convention); NAFTA, supra  
note 5 at Article 1701 (requires compliance with the Berne Convention). 
14 Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 10; NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 
1706(1) (requires the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction 
of sound recordings); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4 at Part II Article 14.2 (requires 
the right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of sound 
recordings).  See also, Article 10 Convention for the Protection of Producers of 
Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms [―Phonograms 
Convention‖] (1971) (each Contracting State must protect producers of phonograms 
against the making of duplicates and against the importation of such duplicates for the 
purpose of distribution to the public and against the distribution of duplicates to the 
public). 
15 Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 11; NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 
1705(c) (requires authors to have the right to authorize or prohibit the 
communication of works to the public); TRIPS, supra note 4 at Article 9.1 (requires 
compliance with the Berne Convention).   
16 Unauthorized copying of musical works and sound recordings can infringe the 
reproduction right in ss.3(1) and 18(1) of the Act.  Copies are made each time a 
musical work or sound recording is uploaded or downloaded.  Sookman: Computer, 
Internet and Electronic-Commerce Law (Thomson Carswell) at s. 3.7(a).  The 
reproduction right is implicated when a work or sound recording is copied onto 
servers for the purposes of offering a streaming or download service.  Statement of 
Royalties to be Collected by CMRRA/SODRAC Inc. for the reproduction of musical 
works in Canada by Ontario Music Services in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Copyright Board, 
March 16, 2007 [―CSI Online Decision‖].  The rights to authorize communications to 
the public and to communicate works to the public are also implicated in the posting 
of a musical work on a website for the purpose of transmission to the public and the 
transmission of performances and downloads to the public.  Society of Composers, 
Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet 
Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427;  Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association 
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III 
THE PROPOSAL‘S INCOMPATIBILITY WITH CANADA‘S THREE-STEP 
OBLIGATIONS 
 
Under the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement, and 
NAFTA, Canada agreed to confine limitations or exceptions to the 
reproduction right for musical works to circumstances in which all 
three of following conditions (known as the ―three-step test‖) are met:  
(1) the limitation or exception is limited to ―certain special cases‖, (2) 
―the reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation‖ of the 
work, and (3) the limitation or exception ―does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author‖.17  Under NAFTA, 
Canada agreed to the same three-step test for exceptions or limitations 
to the exclusive reproduction right associated with sound recordings.18 
The three-step test has its origins in the Berne Convention 
(1971).  Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention states the following: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries in the 
Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain 
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.   
Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement is modelled after Article 
9(2) of the Berne Convention.  It states the following: 
Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to 
exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder. 
Apart from the difference in the use of the terms ―permit‖ and 
―confine‖ and ―author‖ and ―right holder‖, the main difference 
between Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and Article 13 of the 
                                                                                                                                  
v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada 2008 FCA 6; Tariff 
No. 22.A (Internet Online Music Services) 1996-2006, Copyright Board, October 18, 
2007.   
17 Berne Convention, supra note 3 at Article 9(2); TRIPS supra note 4 at Part II, 
Article 13;  NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1705(5); Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras. 
13.11-13.25. 
18 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1706(3). 
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TRIPS Agreement is that the former applies only to the reproduction 
right.  The wording of Article 13 does not contain this limitation and 
applies to all copyright rights in works to be provided by the Berne 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement.19  Accordingly, it applies to 
both the reproduction and communication to the public rights.   
NAFTA goes further than either the Berne Convention or the 
TRIPS Agreement.  Under NAFTA the three-step test applies to 
limitations or exceptions related to sound recordings as well as to 
works protected by copyright such as musical works.20 
Each of the three conditions of the three-step test is given a 
distinct meaning to avoid a reading that could reduce any of the 
conditions to redundancy or inutility.21  Further, the three conditions 
apply on a cumulative basis.  Each is a separate and independent 
requirement that must be satisfied before an exception or limitation 
will comply with the three-step test.  The failure to comply with any 
one of the three conditions results in the exception or limitation being 
disallowed.  For example, an exception that is a special case may 
nonetheless conflict with the normal exploitation step and an 
exception that does not unreasonably conflict with the normal 
exploitation condition could nonetheless unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the author.22  
The Proposal does not meet any of the three conditions of the 
three-step test.  It therefore fails to comply with Canada‘s treaty 
obligations on three separate grounds.  An analysis of the three-step 
test in relation to the Proposal is set out below.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.71-6.74. 
20 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Articles 1705.5, 1706.3. 
21 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.97; WTO Patent Decision, supra  note 12 at 
para. 7.21.  
22 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.97;  WTO Patent Decision, supra  note 12 at 
para. 7; Ficsor, supra note 10 at 91-92; WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.74;  M. 
Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test (2004) [―Senftleben‖] at 
para. 4.3.; Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras. 13.11-13.25.   
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IV 
FIRST STEP: THE PROPOSAL IS NOT A ―CERTAIN SPECIAL CASE‖ 
 
The first step, the ―certain special case‖ limitation condition, 
imposes at least two, and according to some authorities three 
requirements.  Limitations or exceptions are a ―certain special case‖ 
only if they are (i) ―clearly defined‖, (ii) narrow in scope and reach, 
and (iii) can be justified on a sound policy rationale.23 
The word ―certain‖ means ―known and particularized, but not 
explicitly identified; determined, fixed, not variable: definitive, 
precise, exact‖.  The term ―certain‖ means that under the first 
condition an exception or limitation in national legislation must be 
clearly defined.  This guarantees a sufficient degree of legal 
certainty.24  
To satisfy the first condition more is required than that the 
exception or limitation be clearly defined.  It must be also a ―special‖ 
case.  It must accordingly be narrow in its scope and reach.25  In the 
WTO Decision, a case which addressed whether S.110(5) of the 
United States Copyright Act complied with S.13 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the WTO Panel defined the meaning of the word 
―special‖ as follows: 
We also have to give full effect to the ordinary meaning of 
the second word of the first condition.  The term ―special‖ 
connotes ―having an individual or limited application or 
purpose‖, ―containing details; precise, specific‖, ―exceptional 
in quality or degree; unusual; out of the ordinary‖ or 
―distinctive in some way‖.  This term means that more is 
needed than a clear definition in order to meet the standard 
of the first condition.  In addition, an exception or 
limitation must be limited in its field of application or 
exceptional in its scope.  In other words, an exception or 
limitation should be narrow in quantitative as well as a 
qualitative sense.  This suggests a narrow scope as well as an 
                                                          
23 Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.55, 10.03; WIPO Guide to the Copyright and 
Related Rights Treaties Administered by WIPO (2003) [―WIPO Guide‖], at CT-10.2 at 
213. 
24 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.108; Ricketson, supra note 10 at 764. 
25 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.109; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.55, 
10.03; WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2; Ricketson, supra note 10 at §13.11.   
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exceptional or distinctive objective.  To put this aspect of 
the first condition into the context of the second condition 
(―no conflict with a normal exploitation‖), an exception or 
limitation should be the opposite of a non-special, i.e., a 
normal case.26 
There is debate whether the first step imposes a third, public 
policy requirement.  Although several authorities have suggested that 
there is no such additional requirement,27 a number have concluded 
that a special case must be supported by some sound, social and legal-
political reason to justify its application.  For example, the WIPO 
Guide to the Berne Convention interprets the term ―special case‖ as 
follows: 
This means that the use covered must be specific – precisely 
and narrowly determined – and that no broadly-determined 
cases are acceptable;  and also that, as regards its objective, 
it must be ―special‖ in the sense that it must be justifiable by 
some clear public policy considerations.28 
Prof. Ficsor in the Law of Copyright and the Internet 
expresses a similar opinion:   
First, the use in question must be for a quite specific 
purposes: a broad kind of exemption would not be justified.  
Secondly, there must be something ―special‖ about this 
purpose, ―special‖ here meaning that it is justified by some 
clear reason of public policy or some other exceptional 
circumstance.29 
Jörg Reinbothe and Silke von Lewinski in their treatise The 
WIPO Treaties agree that limitations and exceptions should be based 
on a ―specific and sound policy objective‖.  They state that ―policy 
areas of concern or relevance to limitations and exceptions may be 
public education, public security, freedom of expression, the needs of 
disabled persons, or the like‖.30 
                                                          
26 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.109. 
27 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.111-6.112; Ricketson, supra note 10 at 
para. 13.11. 
28 WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2.    
29 Ficsor, supra note 10 at para. 5.55.   
30 Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski. The WIPO treaties 1996 : the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty : commentary 
and legal analysis. (London : Butterworths, 2002) at 124 [Reinbothe].   
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The interpretation of the term ―special case‖ was canvassed in 
an opinion rendered by the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts 
which addressed whether private copying from illegal sources such as 
P2P networks would comply with the three-step test set out in the 
Berne Convention.  The Council held it would not.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Council interpreted the term ―special case‖ as 
requiring a sound public policy reason:   
First ―step‖:  exceptions and limitations may only cover 
―special cases.‖  This condition is partly of a quantitative, 
and partly of a quantitative, normative nature.  It is of a 
quantitative nature in the sense that exceptions and 
limitations may only be applied in a narrower scope, and it 
is of a qualitative, normative nature in the sense that there 
is a need for some sound, social and legal-political reasons 
to justify their application.31 
Based on the foregoing, to determine whether the Proposal 
complies with the first condition of the three-step test, it is necessary 
to determine at a minimum whether the Proposal is ―clearly defined‖ 
and narrow in scope and reach, and, according to at least some 
authorities, whether it can be justified by a sound public policy 
purpose.32  The Proposal does not meet any of these conditions. 
 
A. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT CERTAIN 
 
As noted above, to be ―certain‖ an exception must be clearly 
defined to provide a sufficient degree of legal certainty.  The Proposal 
does not meet this test.  The Proposal states that it targets online 
sharing of songs, including the sharing of music on P2P networks‖.33  
It also states that it targets illegal downloading over mobile phone 
networks.34   However, the Proposal defines Music File Sharing ―as the 
sharing of a copy of a copyrighted musical work without motive of 
financial gain.‖  This definition could include all copying of musical 
works done without a profit motive.  Examples given in the Proposal 
                                                          
31 Hungarian Decision, supra note 10  at 12-13.   
32 See Noel, supra note 9 at 12 also adopting the more rigorous two-prong test in 
interpreting the term ―special‖.  
33 See paras. 3 and 4 of the Summary of Proposal.   
34 See para. 1 Summary of Proposal. 
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are sharing music over P2P networks, wireless networks, email, CD, 
DVDs and hard drives.35  On this view, any copying from any source 
and onto any media would be covered.36  It could also cover musical 
ringtones.  There are real questions as to what is the intended scope of 
the exception.  In any event, the Proposal does not comply with the 
requirement that an exception be a ―certain‖ special case.   
 
B. THE PROPOSAL IS NOT NARROW IN SCOPE AND REACH 
 
More fundamentally, the proposed file sharing exception is 
also not narrow in scope or reach.  In examining the scope of the 
proposed file sharing exception, it is appropriate to take into account, 
among other factors, the potential users who could be excepted from 
liability, the acts that would be excepted, and the impact of the 
proposed exception on other substitutable sources of music.37  The 
Proposal has the following scope: 
 It would permit music file sharing by every Canadian 
citizen as long as it is without motive of financial gain. 
 It would permit sharing of both musical works and 
sound recordings, since both rights subsist in music 
that is reproduced electronically.  
 It would permit sharing illegally made (infringing) 
copies of music. 
 The purpose of the sharing could be to obtain the only 
copy of the music ever acquired by the downloader.  
As such, the Proposal would permit not only copying 
for secondary purposes, e.g., to obtain a second copy 
for use on a different format, but to acquire the only 
copy that individuals may ever acquire.  It would thus 
directly substitute  (or replace) purchased copies. 
 The file sharing technologies used to share music 
could be any file sharing service, including P2P  
                                                          
35 See Proposal at para. 5.   
36 The Proposal is not even limited to digital copying, however.  It could conceivably 
also include the reproduction of musical scores, musical compositions, and copying of 
sheet music. 
37 WTO Decision, supra note12 at paras. 6.113, 6.127, 6.131-6.133, 6.148. 
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services like the former Napster, Grokster, or Kazaa; 
Web and BitTorrent sites like QuebecTorrent, 
IsoHunt, and TorrentBox; and not-for-profit music 
sharing sites.   
 The media onto which music could be copied would 
be unlimited and would include computers, PDAs, 
digital audio recording devices (DARs) including 
iPods, cellphones, CDs, and DVDs.   
 The Proposal would permit unauthorized copying 
onto all sorts of other hardware, such as hardware 
equipped with memory chips, radio and television 
sets, digital cameras, digital video units, car stereos, 
automobile information systems, watches, kitchen 
appliances and so forth. 
 The proposal would except from infringement both 
downloads and streams.  It would, accordingly, also 
permit streaming through a variety of sites and 
services including Graboid.com; linking sites, like 
youtvpc.com, www.addictivejunk.com and 
www.peekvid.com; and sites, like youtube.com, that 
streams music and other files.   
 Copying of every type and genre of music would be 
excepted from liability.  This could even include music 
embodied in other content, such as movies, games and 
software.   
As the above demonstrates, virtually every Canadian with a 
mobile phone or an Internet connection, a personal computer, a CD 
or DVD burner, an iPod or other DAR would fall under the exception.  
Literally any imaginable copying would be included, unless it is done 
with a motive of financial gain.  The Proposal in effect is an unlimited 
license to copy music.  The Proposal, far from being a ―special case‖ 
that is narrow in scope and reach, would be the opposite.  It would 
become a normal case.  The net result would be a near total levitation 
of the copyright system, where exclusive rights would effectively 
cease to exist with respect to digital copying.38  The proposed file 
                                                          
38 Brent Hugenholtz et al, ―The Future of Levies in a Digital Environment, Final 
Report, Institute for Information Law‖, March 2003 at 41 [IViR Final Report]. 
114 
 
sharing exception would accordingly not meet the first condition of 
being a certain ―special‖ case.39   
That the Proposal would not comply with the first condition 
of the three-step test is supported by authorities that have considered 
this question.  Bob Rietjens recently considered whether an 
alternative compensation system to permit P2P file sharing for non-
commercial purposes would comply with the special case condition of 
the three-step test. He concluded that ―P2P licences are not compliant 
with the first step of the three-step test.  A P2P licence does not 
qualify as narrow in scope, both in regard to the number of potential 
users and in regard to the types of works covered.‖40 
Prof. Jane Ginsberg also concluded that a broad exception to 
exclusive rights to permit digital copying over P2P networks cannot 
be characterized as a specific case:   
―Because more and more works are marketed directly to 
end users, private copying should no longer be 
characterized ‗certain special cases‘: it is becoming a leading 
mode of exploitation.‖41 
The Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts considered this 
question in determining whether private copying from illegitimate 
P2P sources could comply with the first condition of the three-step 
test.  The Council concluded that it could not, because it would make 
digital copying the normal case, rather than a special case, and 
because it could not be justified on sound public policy considerations:   
If private copying were allowed also from illegal sources, it 
would conflict with the criteria of ―special cases.‖ First, it 
would transform the ―special case‖ foreseen for the 
application of the right to remuneration into a general form 
                                                          
39 Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155 argues that blanket licenses in respect of downloads 
can meet the ―special case‖ condition because ―downloads that are part of a specially 
organized public reward mechanism are peculiar and limited, and in the ordinary 
English usage of the expression, they are certainly a special case of infringement.‖  
Eckersley‘s reliance on a ―public reward mechanism‖ is an irrelevant factor under the 
first condition, as the existence of compensation is only relevant in considering the 
third condition.  His conclusion that a blanket download license would be ―peculiar 
and limited‖ is hard to reconcile with its actual scope and reach. 
40 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332.   
41 Ginsberg et al, ―Private Copying in the Digital Environment‖, in Kabel et al, 
Intellectual Property and Information Law (Kluwer Law International 1998) at 149-
151.   
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of reproduction. Second – and this in itself would be 
sufficient to exclude the applicability of any exception or 
limitation – it would not correspond to the condition that 
for the recognition of a ―special case,‖ a sound and well-
founded social, legal-political justification is needed. As 
regards private copying from illegal sources mentioned by 
the petitioner, there are two typical sources. The first one is 
that a work is made public, distributed or communicated to 
the public illegally, in particular by making it available to 
the public through the Internet (as it has happened recently 
in the case of the Hungarian film  ―Üvegtigris 2‖ (―Glass 
Tiger 2‖)), and the other one is that the technological 
protection measure applied by the owner of rights is 
circumvented and the work thus distributed or 
communicated to the public serves as a source of private 
copying. To permit free uses or to limit the exclusive right 
of reproduction to a mere right to remuneration in such 
cases not only would not correspond to the quantitative, 
qualitative and legal-political criteria of ―special cases,‖ but 
it would also be in clear conflict with the very raison d‘être, 
objectives and fundamental nature of copyright. The 
message delivered by it would be devastating: do not care 
that you copy from an illegal source; do not worry that you 
do so without the author‘s consent; copyright is an out-of-
date institution; on the Internet, everything is free; just 
copy any work and use it in this beautiful new world of 
complete freedom! In fact, the illegal web-sites do 
―advertise‖ themselves exactly with this kind of 
―revolutionary ideology.‖42 
For the above reasons the Proposal fails the first step of the 
three-step test. 
                                                          
42 Hungarian Decision at para. 36 (emphasis added).  Alexander Peukert and Carine 
Bernault contend that the non-commercial reproduction of musical works through 
P2P networks would comply with the first condition of the three-step test.  Their 
views assume that the first condition only requires some clear public policy 
consideration to support a P2P non-voluntary license.  Peukert, supra note 8; Carine 
Bernault et al, ―Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Literary and Artistic Property, A 
Feasibility Study Regarding a System of Compensation for the Exchange of works via 
Internet‖.  June 2005.  To the extent such condition exists, their views conflict with 
the persuasive opinion of the Hungarian Council of Copyright Experts set out above.  
In any event, any exception must also be narrow in scope and reach.  Their opinion 
fails to take this part of the three-step test into account. 
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V 
SECOND STEP: THE PROPOSAL WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE NORMAL 
EXPLOITATION CONDITION 
 
The second condition of the three-step test requires that a 
limitation or exception not conflict with ―a normal exploitation‖ of 
the work or sound recording.  The interpretation of this condition 
involves the construction of two terms:  ―exploitation‖ and ―normal‖.   
The ordinary meaning of the term ―exploit‖ connotes ―making 
use of‖ or ―utilizing for one‘s own ends‖.  The term refers to an 
activity by which copyright owners employ the exclusive rights 
conferred on them to extract economic value from their rights.43 
The term ―normal‖ reflects two connotations.  The first is an 
empirical standard of what is regular, usual, typical or ordinary in a 
factual sense.  The second reflects a somewhat more normative, if not 
dynamic, approach that takes into account potential technological and 
market developments.44  An exception or limitation to an exclusive 
right will rise to the level of a conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work if excepted uses enter into economic competition with the 
ways that the rights holders normally, or could potentially, extract 
economic value from that right in the work.  All forms of exploiting a 
work which have, or are likely to acquire, considerable economic or 
practical importance must be reserved to rights holders. Accordingly, 
the phrase ―normal exploitation‖ includes those forms of exploitation 
that currently generate significant or tangible revenues as well as 
those forms of exploitation that, with a certain degree of likelihood 
and plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or practical 
importance.45 
The WIPO Guide summarizes the elements of the second 
condition as follows: 
                                                          
43 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.165; Ricketson at 768; WTO Patent 
Decision, supra note 12 at para. 7.54.   
44 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.166; Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.16; 
WTO Patent Decision, supra note 12 at para. 7.54. 
45 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.177-6.183; Ricketson, supra note 10 at 
paras. 13.18-13.19; Ficsor, supra note 10 at 284-285; Gowers, at para. 34; Peukert, 
supra note 8 at 33-34. 
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Second step (which may only follow if the exception or 
limitation has not ―failed‖ at the first step; that is, it is a 
special case):  an exception or limitation must not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of works.  This means that all 
forms of exploiting a work (that is, extracting value of the 
exclusive right of reproduction in the work through 
exercising it) which ha[ve], or [are] likely to acquire 
considerable economic or practical importance, must be 
reserved to the owner of this right;  and that exceptions or 
limitations must not enter into economic competition with 
the exercise of the right of reproduction by the rights 
owner (in the sense that it must not undermine the market 
for the work in any way whatsoever).46 
The WTO Decision summarized the second condition as 
follows: 
We believe that an exception or limitation to an exclusive 
right in domestic legislation rises to the level of a conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work (i.e., the copyright 
or rather the whole bundle of exclusive rights conferred by 
the ownership of the copyright), if uses, that in principle 
are covered by that right but exempted under the exception 
or limitation, enter into economic competition with the 
ways that right holders normally extract economic value 
from that right to the work (i.e., the copyright) and thereby 
deprive them of significant or tangible commercial gains.47 
There can be little doubt that the online music market is 
increasingly replacing physical sales of music as the primary 
marketplace for virtual sales.  Internationally, the market is rapidly 
migrating from physical to digital formats and the digital distribution 
of music is expanding at a fast pace.48  According to Forrester half of 
                                                          
46 WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at CT-10.2 (emphasis added). 
47 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.183. 
48 ―In-Stat, The Online Music Market: Downloaded Music Will Outpace Physical 
Media Bought Online in 2007 (―Healthy growth in the online music market will 
continue for the rest of the decade, with worldwide sales growing from $1.5 billion in 
2005 to $10.7 million in 2010‖); In-Stat, Online Music and Video: New Distribution 
Channels Emerge (―Online sales of digital music represented 6% of the worldwide 
music market in 2006, up from 4% in 2005, the high-tech market research firm says.  
By 2011, online sales will represent 26% of all music purchased worldwide.‖);  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Overview—Global Entertainment and Media 
Outlook: 2007-2011 (New York: PWC, 2007) (―The composition of the market is 
rapidly migrating from physical to digital formats… We expect digital distribution of 
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all music sold in the United States will be digital in 2011 and sales of 
digitally downloaded music will surpass physical compact disc sales in 
2012.49  This growing online distribution market uses a plethora of 
technologies to offer licensed file sharing including P2P systems and 
services.50  Technologies like BitTorrent DNA have the potential to 
effectively deliver licensed musical content to millions of potential 
buyers of musical content.51  In Canada, music is also being purchased 
over the Internet from legitimate distribution services.  The market 
for paid downloads is growing and there is a growing migration from 
physical to digital formats.52   
                                                                                                                                  
music to expand at a 26.8 percent compound annual rate, more than tripling to $23 
billion in 2011 from $7 billion in 2006.‖);  International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry, IFPI:07 Digital Music Report (London: IFPI, 2007) (―Digital 
music sales are estimated to have almost doubled in value worldwide in 2006, 
reaching an estimated trade value of around US$2 billion.  Digital channels accounted 
for an estimated ten per cent of music sales for the full year 2006, up from 5.5 per cent 
in 2005.‖). 
49 ―Music Downloads to Surpass CD Sales by 2012‖, Boston Business Journal, February 
19, 2008 (―Digital music sales will grow at a compound annual gross rate of 23% over 
the next 5 years, reaching $4.8 billion in revenue by 2012.  In contrast, by 2012, CD 
sales will be reduced to $3.8 billion.‖).  
50 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Digital Broadband 
Content: Music, Report DSTI/ICCPI/IE(2004)12/FINAL (Paris: OECD) at 78-79; 
Michael Einhorn, ―Gorillas in our Midst:  Search for King Kong in the Music Jungle‖, 
(2008) 55 J. Copyr. Soc‘y, at 145.  
51 See a description of the BitTorrent Entertainment Network launched by BitTorrent, 
Inc. at www.bittorrent.com.   
52 Private Copying III Decision (―PC III‖), at 13 (Copyright Board finding that music is 
being purchased over the Internet from ―legitimate distribution services‖);  Private 
Copying 2005, 2006 and 2007 (May 11, 2007) (―PC IV‖), at paras. 60-61 (Copyright 
Board finding that 6% of all private copies were lawfully purchased online);  CSI 
Online Decision, at paras. 2, 6 (Copyright Board concluded that, ―we are now in the 
midst of experiencing the next radical change: the authorized download over the 
Internet of digital files containing sound recordings of musical works.‖);  
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Overview—Global Entertainment and Media 
Outlook: 2007-2011 (New York: PWC, 2007) (―The composition of the market is 
rapidly migrating from physical to digital formats.  We expect digital distribution of 
music to expand at a 26.8 percent compound annual rate, more than tripling to $23 
billion in 2011 from $7 billion in 2006.‖);  Tom Jurenka ―Internet Industry Overview, 
a Report Prepared for Gowling Lefleur Henderson LLP in connection with SOCAN 
Tariff 22‖ (November 2006) at 5 (―Music is one of the great e-commerce success 
stories of the Internet.  In 2005 Canadians ordered just over $7.9 billion worth of 
goods and services over the Internet,  16.4% of which was music of all categories‖); 
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Based on the foregoing, the Proposal does not meet the 
―normal exploitation‖ condition.  The proposed file sharing exception 
would expropriate rights that hold considerable economic and 
practical importance to rights holders, an importance which is likely 
to continue to grow significantly.  Further, the broad scope of the 
proposed file sharing exception would undoubtedly result in music 
sharing that would enter into economic competition with commercial 
sales channels.    
As described above, the ―normal exploitation‖ condition not 
only includes current exploitation methods.  It also includes those 
modes of exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood and 
plausibility, could acquire considerable economic or practical 
importance.  In this regard, digital rights management makes it 
increasingly possible to control unauthorized copying of works and to 
develop innovative new business models desired by consumers.53  The 
Canadian Government has stated that it intends to enact legislation to 
implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty (―WCT‖) and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (―WPPT‖).  A core objective of 
these treaties (the ―WIPO Treaties‖) is to create a favourable legal 
environment, including by protecting TPMs, to bolster the market for 
                                                                                                                                  
―Music on the Internet: A Canadian Perspective‖, Aaron Research, November 2006 
(describing the Canadian sites and services involved in online music distribution).  
53 Gowers at para. 168 (―DRM‘s are a legitimate and acceptable tool used by rights 
holders and are increasingly being used to support new business models.‖);  IViR Final 
Report, supra note 38 at 1 (―In the digital environment, technical protection measures 
and digital rights management systems make it increasingly possible to control how 
individuals use copyrighted works. Rights holders and media distributors are now in a 
position to apply, and are increasingly using, such systems to identify content and 
authors, set forth permissible uses, establish prices according to the market valuation 
of a particular work, and grant licenses directly and automatically to individual users. 
Unlike levies, electronic copyright management systems make it possible to 
compensate right holders directly for the particular uses made of a work. Where such 
individual rights management is available there would appear to remain no need, and 
no justification, for mandatory levy systems.‖); PC III at 11, 62 (Copyright Board 
finding that ―TPMs‖ and ―DRM systems‖ are increasingly being used by rights holders 
―to control the distribution and use of, and access to, music and other content.‖  The 
Board predicted that the ―more widespread TPMs and DRM systems become, the 
more rightsholders are likely to make content available legitimately, and therefore, 
the more consumers can be expected to have otherwise paid for private copying 
rights.‖). 
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distributing digital content to end users.54  The current, exploitation of 
music over digital networks already has brought this form of 
exploitation within the ―normal exploitation‖ condition.  Potential 
future uses of technological protection measures and digital rights 
management information makes the Proposal‘s broad exception for 
copying including copying over digital networks even more 
untenable.55 
It may be argued, as SAC tries to do, that an exception coupled 
with a levy system may be justified based on the obstacles being 
encountered by copyright owners in enforcing their rights in the 
digital environment.56  Levy systems have, in fact, been established in 
Canada and around the world as a means of compensating copyright 
holders against de minimis, or technically infringing copying, that is 
too expensive or complicated to prohibit.57  It does not follow, 
                                                          
54 See Copyright Reform Process: A Framework for Copyright Reform, at 4 (June 
2001); Supporting Culture and Innovation (Oct. 2002); Interim Report on Copyright 
Reform, at 2-5 (May 2004); Government Statement on Proposals for Copyright 
Reform (Mar. 2005); CIPO: Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 2005); Counterfeiting 
and Piracy are Theft: Report of the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology, at para. 5 (June 2007). 
55 Ficsor, supra note 10 at C10.34 (―While in the case of ‗traditional off-line and off-air 
‗home taping‘, the exercise of such a right was impossible, on the interactive digital 
network – on the basis of technological measures and rights management information 
– it is very possible.‖);  Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126 (―[L]evy systems have usually 
been based on the reasoning that…the exclusive right of reproduction cannot be 
enforced.  This reasoning looses its strength in the digital environment, which may 
well result in the exclusive right of reproduction to be enforceable, particularly with 
respect to digital private copying.‖);  Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155-157 (Arguing that 
the ―normal exploitation‖ step cannot be met if DRMs can be used to prevent 
widespread unauthorized sharing of files);  Gregory Hagen et al ―Canadian Copyright 
Reform: P2P Sharing, Making Available and the three-step Test‖ (2006) Ottawa Law 
and Technology Journal, 3:2 (arguing against amendments to the Copyright Act to 
implement the WIPO Treaties because such amendments would enable copyright 
holders to control the use of their works thus preventing the establishment of a levy 
system for copying in the digital environment because such a system would fail the 
three-step test). 
56 Eckersley, supra note 7 at 155-157. Eckersley argues that an exception could be 
justified if technological protection measures cannot prevent widespread 
unauthorized sharing of information goods.   
57 Ginsburg, at 149-150 (―private copying could be understood as non-infringing 
because it was de minimis…but too expensive and complicated to prohibit‖); 
Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.33 (―private use would appear to be confined to 
the making of single copies, and the basis for it a kind of de minimis argument‖). 
121 
 
however, that exclusive rights should be effectively replaced by a 
right to receive remuneration because of difficulties in enforcement.  
Prof. Ficsor addresses this argument as follows: 
The idea emerges, time and again, that, if the exclusive 
rights cannot be exercised in the traditional, individual way, 
they should be abolished or reduced to a mere right of 
remuneration.  It is not, however, justified to claim that, if a 
right cannot be exercised in a way in which it has been 
traditionally exercised, it should be eliminated or 
considerably reduced.  In such a situation, there is no 
reason for drawing the conclusion that a non-voluntary 
license system is needed.  There is a much more appropriate 
option, namely the collective administration of exclusive 
rights.58 
Further, the Proposal does not contemplate a limited or de 
minimis exception and hence does not meet the ―special case‖ first 
condition.  In addition, even though there is substantial unauthorized 
copying, there is still a substantial marketplace for sales of music on 
CD formats and a growing legitimate online distribution market place.  
These marketplaces would be effectively undermined by an exception 
to permit unlimited file sharing of music.  The difficulties in enforcing 
rights in the digital environment is not, in these circumstances, a 
sufficient basis to overcome the second condition of the three-step 
test.   
Bob Rietjens addresses and rejects the argument that the 
inability of rights holders to enforce their rights against P2P file 
sharing is a sufficient basis to grant a broad exception from 
infringement:   
The Panel [in the WTO Decision] took a much broader 
scope regarding the normative test: ‗We believe that an 
exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic 
legislation rises to the level of a conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work . . . if uses, that . . . are covered by 
that right but exempted . . . enter into economic 
competition with the ways that right holders normally 
extract economic value from that right to the work . . . .‘.  
                                                          
58 M. Ficsor Collective Administration of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights 
(Geneva: WIPO, 1990) at 6, (emphasis added) quoted by Daniel Gervais, ―Collective 
Management of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in Canada: An International 
Perspective‖ (2001).   
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The proper question thus is: do the acts allowed under the 
exception enter into competition with the ways that right 
holders normally exploit the work?  This broader test 
entails that it is not merely the financial interest in the part 
that is split off from the copyright owner‘s bundle of rights 
that is relevant.  One must assess whether the exempted 
acts enter into competition with all the ways in which right 
holders normally extract economic value from their 
copyright.  The ‗half a loaf of bread is better than none at 
all‘ argument is, therefore, not compliant with the second 
step of the three-step test.  How does this relate to the P2P 
licence?  In short: the fact that the copyright industry 
cannot enforce certain acts is not relevant as a levy system 
would undermine the normal exploitation forms used by 
the copyright industry.59   
The argument made by SAC that the exception only applies to 
non-commercial file sharing also does not enable the Proposal to pass 
the ―normal exploitation‖ condition.  It is neither likely nor plausible 
to assert that a wholesale non-commercial exception for file sharing 
would not significantly, and potentially mortally, impair the 
marketplace for traditional CD sales as well as the online digital sales 
of music.  These sales and services would be expected to compete with 
free file sharing.  Consumers would believe that the $5 per month 
payment gives them the entitlement to obtain music for free.  In such 
circumstances, it cannot reasonably be expected that consumers 
would believe they should pay twice to acquire music.  Bob Rietjens 
agrees: 
It should be considered whether the legalization of P2P 
networks has an effect on the sales of CDs, as sales of CDs 
are a normal form of exploitation. P2P has a negative effect 
on sales of CDs as ‗freely‘ downloadable music seems to be a 
close substitute for off-line commercially purchased music.  
Thus, legalized P2P use conflicts with a normal exploitation 
of the work, in the sense that it competes with current 
forms of exploitation that generate revenue, ie the sale of 
CDs.   
A similar argument goes for legal music download sites.  
These sites seem to boom at the moment.  There are 
currently around 150 legal music download websites on the 
                                                          
59 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 331 (emphasis added). 
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Internet of which 100 are in Europe.  iTunes, MyCoke-
Music.com, PureTracks, Sony‘s Connect, Napster, etc. are 
doing good business. At any European site there are at least 
450,000 tracks available.  Some four million Europeans have 
already paid for online music, but there would hardly seem 
to be an incentive to use these sites if you are already 
entitled to download music anyway (and are already 
indirectly paying for it) under a P2P licence.  This view is 
supported by the Panel‘s view that substitution effects 
should be taken into account.  With regard to the ‗business‘ 
exception, the Panel stated that it was relevant that 
establishments might be induced to ‗switch from recorded 
or live music, which is subject to the payment of a fee, to 
music played on radio or television, which is free of charge‘.  
Apparently, substitution effects are important for the 
second step of the three-step test.60 
Further, in determining whether the second condition has 
been met, a possible conflict with a normal exploitation of a particular 
exclusive right cannot be counterbalanced or justified by the mere 
fact of absence of a conflict with another mode of exploiting the work 
even if the other form of exploitation would generate income for 
rights holders.61  Accordingly, reserving to rights holders the 
commercial marketplace for the distribution of music including a 
potential to offer ―value added‖ services like iTunes or PureTracks 
does not remove the conflict of the proposed file sharing exception 
with the normal exploitation condition. 
The fact that rights holders would be compensated under the 
Proposal by the $5 levy on Internet subscriptions cannot justify the 
file sharing exception.  A right to receive equitable remuneration is 
not a factor that can be taken into account in considering whether an 
exception or limitation would conflict with a normal exploitation of a 
work.  Equitable remuneration can only be considered in the third 
step in determining whether an exception would cause unreasonable 
prejudice.62 
Several authors who have studied proposals for non-voluntary 
licenses to permit non-commercial P2P file sharing have similarly 
                                                          
60 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 331 (emphasis added).     
61 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.172; Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 125.   
62 Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126-127; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.58, 10.33-
10.34; Senftleben, supra note 22 at paras. 4.3.2, 4.3.3.   
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concluded that such proposals would fail to comply with the second 
condition of the three-step test.  Bob Rietjens concluded that the 
second step of the three-step test cannot be met by a levy system 
designed to provide compensation for non-commercial licensed 
copying over P2P networks: 
The P2P licence does not survive the scrutiny of the second 
condition of the three-step test.  The acts exempted by a 
P2P licence (ie file sharing) compete with the normal 
exploitation of works by the copyright industry.63 
Christophe Geiger expressed the same opinion in considering 
whether the three-step test could be met by the creation of non-
voluntary licenses to legalize P2P file sharing:  
Yet it seems hard to reconcile such solutions with the 
second step, even by adopting a restrictive conception of 
the notion of ―normal exploitation.‖  Such a solution would 
certainly encroach directly on the main market of online 
exploitation of works and would therefore violate the three-
step test.64 
Alexander Peukert, in a comprehensive law review article on 
the subject, concluded that legalized P2P file sharing schemes are 
incompatible with even the most restrictive view of the second 
condition: 
Applying these definitions to the proposals raises severe 
doubts regarding their compatibility with the three-step 
test.  The reason is that the uses covered by the proposed 
non-voluntary license, i.e. copying and distributing content 
online by way of up- and downloads or streaming are a 
source of income today and will probably become even 
more important in the future.  Right holders increasingly 
establish commercial platforms offering their content for 
download or streaming.  Assuming that a complete shift to 
commercial online distribution by way of streaming is 
plausible at least for music and perhaps motion 
pictures…non-voluntary licenses covering non-commercial 
                                                          
63 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332.  
64 Christophe Geiger, ―The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright 
Law to the Information Society, UNESCO, Copyright Bulletin, January-March 2007, 
at 8-9. 
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file sharing can hardly be considered to be in line with the 
second criterion of the three-step test.65 
The conclusion that the Proposal would not comply with the 
―normal exploitation‖ condition of the three-step test is supported by 
leading authorities that have interpreted the three-step test.  Martin 
Senftleben concluded:   
If a specific privilege, like the exemption of time-shifting, 
does not pose substantial difficulties, a broad limitation 
generally privileging strictly private use in the digital 
environment certainly does… [I]t is inevitable to conclude 
that the broad privileges serving strictly personal use which 
are known from the analogue world are likely to conflict 
with a normal exploitation of copyrighted material in the 
digital environment.  If the digital revolution really takes 
place and more and more works are directly marketed to 
end-users, this emerging ―leading mode of exploitation‖ will 
be threatened by the general exemption of private copying.  
That the privilege would then erode the economic core of a 
wide variety of works can hardly be denied.  It would 
encroach upon a typical major source of income.66 
Prof. Ficsor expressed the same opinion after canvassing 
statements made by prominent copyright experts at a WIPO 
worldwide symposium dealing with issues of the impact of digital 
technology on copyright and related rights: 
As these views clearly indicate, private copying through the 
global information network is emerging as a major form of 
utilization of works.  Accepting the idea that every user of 
the network should have the privilege to make a 
reproduction freely for private, personal purposes – 
considering the breathtaking growth of the Internet 
population – would mean accepting that normal 
exploitation of works would become impossible, and not 
only on the global network but, as a consequence of free 
availability of perfect copies, also in major ‗off-line‘ 
markets.  Such a practice which so obviously conflicts with 
basic forms of normal exploitation of works should not be 
allowed under Article 9 of the Berne Convention (and 
equally not under the TRIPS Agreement and the WCT 
which incorporates this provision by reference).  And since 
                                                          
65 Peukert, supra note 8 at 34 (emphasis added).  
66 Senftleben, supra note 22 at 204, 206. 
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we are faced here with serious conflicts with normal 
exploitation and not only with ‗simple‘ prejudice to the 
owners of rights, it is not sufficient to handle the problem 
through the recognition of a mere right to remuneration, 
with all the inadequacies of such remuneration systems and 
with all the doubts about their compatibility with 
international norms concerning the right of reproduction 
and national treatment.67 
The Hungarian Decision also specifically addressed whether 
an exception to permit copying from unauthorized sources made 
available through P2P networks would comply with the normal 
exploitation step of the three-step test.  After concluding that such an 
exception, even if enacted as part of a levy scheme, would not comply 
with the first step, the Council expressed the opinion that it would 
also fail the second step:  
In the case of the second ―step,‖ this does not require too 
much effort, since on the basis of the findings outlined 
above concerning the first ―step,‖ the answer seems obvious. 
The ―on-line‖ making available of works in digital form, 
along with copy-protection technological measures, for 
private copying (downloading) has become a form of 
normal exploitation. In view of this, the permission of this 
kind of private from illegal sources would be in clear 
conflict with this form of normal exploitation of the works 
concerned.68 
Based on the foregoing, the Proposal would also fail the 
second step of the three-step test. 
 
VI 
THIRD STEP: THE PROPOSAL WOULD UNREASONABLY PREJUDICE THE 
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF RIGHTS HOLDERS  
 
Given that the Proposal would not pass either the first or 
second steps of the three-step test, it is unnecessary to consider 
whether the third step would be met.  Given the very serious impacts 
                                                          
67 Ficsor, supra 10 at para. C 10.34. 
68 Hungarian Decision at para. 37. 
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of the Proposal on right holders, however, even the third step of the 
three step test could not be met. 
The analysis of the third condition of the three-step test 
requires two determinations.  First, one must determine the 
―legitimate interests‖ of right holders at stake.  Then, it is necessary to 
determine whether a prejudice reaches an ―unreasonable‖ level.69   
The word ―legitimate‖ is commonly defined as (a) 
conformable to, sanctioned or authorized by, law or principle: lawful; 
justifiable; proper; (b) normal, regular, conformable to a recognized 
standard type.70  The term ―interests‖ may encompass a legal right or 
title to a property or to the use or benefit of a property including 
intellectual property.  It may also refer to a concern about a potential 
detriment or advantage, and more generally to something that is of 
some importance to a person.  The notion of ―interest‖ is thus not 
necessarily limited to actual or potential economic advantage or 
detriment.71   
The term ―legitimate interest‖ relates to lawfulness from a 
legal positivist perspective.  However, it also has the connotation of 
legitimacy from a more normative perspective that calls for the 
protection of interests that are justifiable in the light of the objectives 
that underlie the protection of exclusive rights.  The interests to be 
protected are those that are justifiable in the sense that they are 
supported by relevant public policies or other social norms.72 
A limitation or exception will ―unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests‖ of the rights holder if it unreasonably deprives 
the copyright owner of the right to enjoy and exercise the right of 
reproduction as fully as possible, or where it causes or could cause an 
unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner.73  Remuneration 
paid under a compulsory licensing scheme can be considered in 
determining whether an exception causes unreasonable prejudice.  
                                                          
69 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.222. 
70 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.224; WTO Patent Decision supra  note 12at 
para. 7.68. 
71 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.223. 
72 WTO Decision, supra note 12 at para. 6.224; WTO Patent Decision, supra  note 12 
at paras. 7.68-7.73; Ricketson, supra note 10 at paras. 13.23-13.25. 
73 Ficsor Copyright, at paras. 5.57, 10.03; WTO Decision, supra note 12 at paras. 6.220-
6.229. 
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But remuneration will avoid unreasonable prejudice only in justifiable 
cases. 74   
The third step allows a balancing between the interests of 
rights holders and legitimate societal interests.75  The words ―not 
unreasonably prejudice‖ allows the making of exceptions that may 
cause prejudice of a significant or substantial kind to the authors‘ 
legitimate interests, provided that the exception otherwise satisfies the 
first and second conditions of the three-step test, and as long as it is 
proportionate or within the limits of reason; it must not be 
unreasonable.76  In determining what prejudice the author should 
reasonably be required to tolerate, both the quantity and quality of 
the potential prejudice must be assessed.77  Prof. Ricketson explains 
this with an example of the possibility of creating exceptions to 
address, respectively, the activities of individual photocopying, home 
taping, and file sharing: 
[C]ompare the activities of individual photocopying, with 
individual home taping, and individual file sharing.  The 
first might well pass all three steps, although maybe not 
from a cumulative point of view; the second looked at 
cumulatively, might pass step 2 but not step 3, leading 
inevitable to some kind of compulsory license.  The third 
should not pass step 2, because of its open-ended character, 
and would not therefore arise for consideration under the 
third step.  In this regard, national legislators should not fall 
into the trap of assuming that any unreasonable prejudice 
that might otherwise result to authors can always be 
assuaged through the imposition of a compulsory license: by 
definition, there will always be some ―prejudices‖ that 
cannot be remedied in this way.  While Article 9(2) is far 
from providing a ―bright line‖ rule that can be readily 
applied, the individual and cumulative effect of each of the 
three steps, in particular the third, is to highlight the need 
for care, moderation, and constraint in constructing any 
compulsory licensing scheme under national law.78   
                                                          
74 Senftleben, supra note 22 at para. 4.3.2.   
75 Gowers at para. 34.   
76 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.27; Ficsor, supra note 10 at paras. 5.58, 10.33-
10.34; J. Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 126-127; Senftleben, supra note 22 at paras. 4.3.2, 
4.3.3. 
77 Reinbothe, supra note 30 at 127.   
78 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 13.27. 
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The Hungarian Decision also considered whether an 
exception to permit file sharing from unauthorized sources could be 
justified under the third step of the three-step test.  The Council of 
Copyright Experts expressed the opinion that it could not.  Their 
view, with which we agree, is that such an exception would be 
neither ―legitimate‖ nor ―reasonable‖:   
As pointed out above, in the case of the third ―step,‖ the 
words  ―legitimate‖ and ―unreasonably‖ have a normative, 
value-oriented meaning, and that, in judging whether a 
prejudice to the legitimate interests of authors is reasonable 
or unreasonable, also the possible legitimate interests of 
third parties and of the public at large should be taken into 
account.  The panel believes that there is no need to 
elaborate on the reasons for which it would be  nonsense to 
claim that, in addition to free private copying from legal 
sources, the permission of such copying from illegal sources 
could also be recognized as a legitimate interest of users, 
and that the prejudice caused by this to the owners of rights 
would not be unreasonable.  The right to remuneration 
alone would not be suitable to reduce the prejudice thus 
caused to a reasonable level.  
The Proposal would fail the third condition of the three-step 
test, because it would, essentially, create an expropriation of copyright 
holders‘ rights to exploit music.  Exclusive rights in music would 
effectively cease to exist and rights holders would become almost 
totally dependent on the equitable remuneration levy.  The exception 
would likely compromise the credibility of the copyright system as 
many users would probably consider themselves legitimately free to 
use and abuse copyrighted works in any manner they see fit. The net 
result of the Proposal would be a near total ―levitation‖ of the 
copyright system.79  The proposed file sharing exception would 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of rights holders. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 IViR Report, supra note 38 at 41 (commenting on the implications of applying 
levies to multi-purpose digital machines such as PCs).   
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VII 
THE PROPOSAL‘S INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE ROME CONVENTION  
 
Canada could also not implement the Proposal without 
violating Canada‘s international obligations under the Rome 
Convention.  Under that convention producers of phonograms must 
be given the right ―to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect 
reproduction of their phonograms.‖80  Under the convention 
contracting states can provide for exceptions or limitations for: (a) 
private use; (b) use of short excerpts in connection with the reporting 
of current events; (c) ephemeral fixation by a broadcasting 
organisation by means of its own facilities and for its own broadcasts; 
and (d) use solely for the purposes of teaching or scientific research.81 
None of the above exceptions or limitations would be broad 
enough to permit the Proposal to be implemented into law.  The 
exception for ―private use‖ is limited to a use that is neither public or 
for profit.82  It is principally relevant to copying of phonograms in the 
privacy of the recipient‘s home.83  Exceptions for private use are 
generally confined to the making of single copies by users.84  Private 
use does not, however, extend to acts of commercial scale 
reproduction including acts of making copies for the purposes of 
distribution to others, or making copies by means of P2P file share 
services.85  ―The Rome Convention thus limits the definition of 
―private‖ copying in a way similar to the private copying exception in 
the Canada Copyright Act; a copy made for the personal use of the 
maker, and not for the purpose of distribution, or for the purpose of 
                                                          
80 Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Article 10. The term ―phonogram‖ is defined to 
mean ―any exclusively aural fixation of sounds of a performance or of other sounds‖.  
The term ―reproduction‖ is broadly defined to mean ―the making of a copy or copies 
of a fixation‖.  Ibid. Article 3. 
81 Ibid. At Article 15(1). 
82 WIPO Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms Convention, (WIPO 
1981), Commentary 15.2 to Article 15 to the Rome Convention.  The WIPO Guide 
expressly notes, ―As to phonogram producers, the ease with which recording of high 
quality can be made these days places the idea of private use in a new dimension.‖  
Ibid.   
83 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.12 
84 Ibid. at para. 13.33 (―private use would appear to be confined to the making of 
single copies‖). 
85 Ibid. at para. 19.12.  
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trade or for communication to the public by telecommunication.  The 
peer-to-peer ―sharing‖ that is at the essence of the SAC Proposal is not 
permitted under the Rome Convention.‖86  
SAC itself acknowledges that its Proposal goes further than an 
exception for private copying.  The Proposal makes this clear in the 
following statement: 
The new right would make it legal to share music between 
two or more parties, whether over Peer to Peer networks, 
wireless networks, email, CD, DVD, hard drives etc.  
Distinct from private copying, this new right would 
authorize the sharing of music with other individuals.87 
Article 15(2) of the convention also permits exceptions or 
limitations in the following situations: 
Irrespective of paragraph 1 of this Article, any Contracting 
State may, in its domestic laws and regulations, provide for 
the same kinds of limitations with regard to the protection 
of performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting 
organisations, as it provides for, in its domestic laws and 
regulations, in connection with the protection of copyright 
in literary and artistic works.  However, compulsory 
licences may be provided for only to the extent to which 
they are compatible with this Convention. 
This paragraph permits exceptions or limitations where they 
fall within the boundaries provided by domestic laws with respect to 
the protection of copyright in works.  It allows for the same type of 
exceptions or limitations that are provided to works to apply to 
phonograms. 88  It is also an indirect reference to the three-step test in 
the Berne Convention as the basis of exceptions and limitations in 
domestic copyright laws must, as a matter of that convention, 
conform to that test.89 Since the Proposal cannot be implemented with 
respect to musical works without violating the three-step test under 
the Berne Convention, Canada would be equally unable to enact 
                                                          
86 Rome Convention, supra note 6 at Ss. 80(1); 80(2). 
87 Proposal at para. 5. (emphasis added) 
88 WIPO Guide at RC-15.3; Guide to the Rome Convention and to the Phonograms 
Convention (WIPO 1981) at para. 15-7-15.9. 
89 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.16. 
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legislation to implement the Proposal with respect to sound 
recordings under the Rome Convention.90 
Moreover, under Article 15(2) compulsory licences can only 
be enacted to the extent they are compatible with the convention.  
The Rome Convention allows for compulsory licenses only in limited 
circumstances, none of which would apply to permit the 
expropriation of producers‘ reproduction rights in sound recordings in 
exchange for a mere right of remuneration as contemplated by the 
Proposal.91  
The failure of the Proposal to comply with the provisions of 
the Rome Convention provides a further basis for concluding that it 
would violate the TRIPS Agreement.  Under Article 14.2 of TRIPS, 
producers of phonograms must enjoy the right to authorize or 
prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms.  
Article 14.6 of TRIPS permits exceptions or limitations to this right 
only to the extent permitted by the Rome Convention.  Accordingly, 
since the Proposal could not be implemented without violating the 
Rome Convention, it could not be implemented into law without also 
abrogating Canada‘s obligations under TRIPS. 
 
VIII 
THE PROPOSAL COULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED WITHOUT ABROGATING 
OR AMENDING THE BERNE CONVENTION, TRIPS, NAFTA AND THE 
ROME CONVENTION  
 
For the reasons given above, the Proposal could not be 
implemented by Canada without violating Canada‘s international 
obligations under the Berne Convention, Rome Convention the 
TRIPS Agreement and NAFTA, unless each of those international 
instruments were amended to make the Proposal possible.  Indeed, 
many of the proponents of such schemes have expressly 
                                                          
90 As detailed above, Canada would also be unable to enact the Proposal with respect 
to sound recordings because under NAFTA exceptions and limitations to the 
reproduction right in sound recordings must comply with the three-step test and the 
Proposal would not comply with that test. 
91 Ricketson, supra note 10 at para. 19.16 (pointing out that compulsory licenses are 
allowed under Art. 7(2)(2) (broadcasting of performances), Art. 12 (broadcasting of 
phonograms), and Art. 13(d) (communication to the public of certain broadcasts)). 
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acknowledged that their proposals could not be implemented without 
changes to international agreements related to copyright.  Prof. 
Fisher, for example, notes that the Berne Convention and the TRIPS 
Agreement would need to be modified before his alternate 
compensation proposal could be implemented.92  Prof. Lessig expressly 
acknowledges that some of his proposals ―would require changes to or 
the abrogation of some treaties‖, identifying in particular the Berne 
Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Treaties as those 
that would need to be changed or breached.93  Other individuals who 
have studied the compliance of non-voluntary licenses with the three-
step test concur.  These proposals, like the Proposal, do not meet the 
internationally accepted test for exceptions and limitations to 
exclusive rights. 94 
                                                          
92 Fisher at 247-248.  Prof. Fisher expressed the view that there could be some 
discretion with respect to recordings of musical compositions pursuant to Article 13 
of the Berne Convention.  However, Article 13(1) only permits the imposition of 
reservations and conditions ―to authorize the sound recording‖ of a musical work.  
This provision addresses the fixation of a musical work onto a sound recording, which 
was likely intended to encompass the recording of a musical work by instruments 
capable of reproducing them mechanically.  See WIPO Guide at BC-13.1 (explaining 
the history of the provision).  Article 13 does not permit exceptions for otherwise 
reproducing musical works.  Nor would it allow any exceptions to Canada‘s 
obligations to provide rights holders with the exclusive right of authorizing 
reproductions of sound recordings under NAFTA.  
93 Lessig, supra note 7 at 330-331.  Canada has not yet ratified the WIPO Treaties.  
Accordingly, this article does not address the Proposal‘s compliance with those 
treaties. 
94 Rietjens, supra note 8 at 332 (―The interpretation by the Panel [in the WTO 
Decision] of the TRIPS three-step test indicates that only those exclusions that allow 
de minimus use are allowed, regardless of lack of effective or affordable means of 
enforcement or social or cultural policy reasons.  P2P licensing is a clear breach of 
countries‘ obligations under the TRIPS three-step test.  In the EU/USA WTO dispute, 
the USA decided not to amend its copyright laws. Instead it decided to pay a yearly 
damage (‗buy out‘) to the EU.  In contrast, it is clear that countries can not buy their 
way out of a P2P licence as the amount of damages would simply be too high.  P2P 
licensing might be academically challenging, but it seems of little practical 
importance, as P2P licensing is not compliant with the TRIPS three-step test.‖); 
Geiger at 8 (―Such a solution would certainly encroach directly on the main market of 
on-line exploitation of works and would therefore violate the three-step test.‖); 
Peukert, supra note 8 at 78-79 (―This paper has shown, however, that none of the 
currently discussed models is in accordance with obligations contained in 
international copyright law. The BC, TRIPS and WCT rest upon the notion of legal 
and technological exclusivity enjoyed by the copyright owner. They are opposed to 
the implementation of statutory, non-voluntary licenses covering non-commercial 
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Prof. Litman, recognizing that a non-voluntary license regime 
would not comply with United States treaty obligations, proposed an 
opt-out mechanism, which would allow rights holders to choose not 
to participate in the scheme (the SAC proposal contains no such opt-
out mechanism).  However, it is clear that she also doubts whether 
her proposal for a statutory default rule, even with an opt-out 
procedure, would comply with United States treaty obligations.  She 
states that such a process would ―be deemed at least arguably 
compliant‖ with United States‘ treaty obligations under the Berne 
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.  However, she notes 
that her ―proposal‘s Berne-compatibility is optional‖ and she also 
apparently doubted whether an opt-out proposal would comply with 
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention, which prohibits imposing any 
formalities on the enjoinment or exercise of rights.95   
The doubts expressed by Prof. Litman as to whether a non-
voluntary alternate compensation system could be established based 
on an opt-out mechanism are well founded.  Under Article 5(2) of the 
Berne Convention, the enjoinment and the exercise of the rights to be 
provided ―shall not be subject to any formality; such enjoinment and 
such exercise shall be independent of the existence of the protection 
in the country of origin of work‖.  ―Formalities‖ are any conditions or 
measures, independent from those related to the creation of a work, 
without the fulfilment of which the work is not protected or loses 
protection.  Registration, deposit of the original or a copy, and the 
indication of a notice are typical examples.96  An opt-out model would 
be a condition or measure affecting the enjoinment and the exercise of 
rights holders‘ exclusive rights.  Alexander Peukert, after considering 
                                                                                                                                  
file sharing. Only if the right holder is free to decide whether she wants her work to 
be subject to a levy/tax system is exclusivity as the fundamental requirement of 
international copyright law accomplished. What is more, exclusive rights and 
individual licensing have to be the legal default. Therefore, only an opt-in model 
according to which the right holder has to register the work for the levy/tax system 
can be implemented in national law without the need to amend international 
copyright treaties or terminate membership.‖). See also OECD Report at 92 (―New 
compulsory licenses for P2P could also be found to interfere with obligations under 
the major international agreements dealing with copyright such as the Berne 
Convention and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.‖);  Ficsor, supra note 10 at para. C10.33-
10.34.   
95 Litman, supra note 7 at 43-44 and footnotes 166-167.   
96 WIPO Guide, supra note 23 at § BC-5.7.   
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the opt-out models suggested by Profs. Litman and Prof. Fisher, came 
to the same conclusion: 
To sum up, the opt-out model as suggested by Jessica 
Litman and William Fisher is a state-required formality for 
the enjoyment of minimum exclusive rights. It is thus not in 
line with Art. 5(2) [of the Berne Convention]. The reason is 
again that international copyright law persists in the notion 
of exclusive rights, even in the digital network 
environment. These exclusive rights have to come into 
existence without further formalities as the statutory 
default. To provide for exclusivity only under the condition 
that the right holder opts out of a levy/tax system does not 
meet this requirement.97 
 
IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
The SAC Proposal for the monetization of file sharing of 
music in Canada would, in return for a right of equitable 
remuneration, effectively legalize the copying and distribution of 
music over online networks and onto any other conceivable media 
and devices.  The Proposal would, if implemented effectively, result in 
unlicensed file sharing becoming the norm in Canada.  The Proposal 
would usurp markets currently being exploited by copyright owners, 
                                                          
97 Peukert, supra note 8 at 65.  See also Daniel Gervais, ―Towards a New Core 
International Copyright Norm:  The Reverse Three-Step Test‖ bepress Legal Series, 
paper 214, (March 2004) at 71-73. (―Because the Berne Convention, the substantive 
obligations of which were incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement, severely limits the 
availability of compulsory licensing, at least for the rights of composers, any licensing 
system should thus be voluntary.  I believe this is also in line with traditional 
copyright policy: if a rights holder does not want his work licensed, then he should 
have that right‖).  Prof. Gervais has expressed the opinion that an opt-out mechanism 
could be implemented as part of an extended collective licensing regime.  An 
extended collective license is not a non-voluntary license or a remuneration regime 
for private copying.  Daniel Gervais, Application of an Extended Collective Licensing 
Regime in Canada:  Principles and Issues Related to Implementation, study prepared 
for the Department of Canadian Heritage, June 2003 at 17, 26-27.  (Prof. Gervais also 
noted in discussing extended collective licensing that a compulsory license with no 
opt-out rights can only exist ―where international conventions allow the 
implementation of a compulsory license, as is the case with cable retransmission‖.  
Ibid. 
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including markets that are growing in size and importance.  The 
proposed music file sharing exception would, in effect, create a 
competitive marketplace in which rights holders would be expected 
to compete for business with free music sharing by individuals 
through the use of P2P and other file sharing systems.  The overall 
effect would be the expropriation, or near expropriation, of copyrights 
in musical works and sound recordings. Copyright holders‘ only 
realistic form of compensation would be the proposed levy system.   
For the reasons given above, the Proposal would not comply 
with any of the three conditions in the three-step test.  Accordingly, 
it could not be implemented without abrogating Canada‘s 
international obligations related to copyright or without amendments 
to the Berne Convention, Rome Convention, the TRIPS and NAFTA. 
